The complex equivalence is a language pattern of the metamodel (and due to the reversed metamodel also of the Miltonmodel of course). The complex equivalence is a distortion as it equalizes two things by stating “A = B”. It is important to note that A and B have to be two different “complexes”, i.e. things, activities or processes. If B is a property of A then there is only one complex and for that reason no complex equivalence.
Also it is a mistake to think of complex equivalences as being about “A means B”. Meaning something is quite different than being equal. For instance a specific rain can mean that the rain season has started, yet a single rain storm is quite something different than the rain season.
Judgment: this is the belief that ‘such and such is the case’. Thus, judgment involves admitting having encountered an identical case: it thus presupposes comparison, with the help of memory. Judgment does not create the appearance of an identical case. Instead, it believes it perceives one; it works on the supposition that identical cases even exist. But what is that function, which must be much older and have been at work much earlier, that levels out and assimilates cases in themselves dissimilar? What is that second function which, on the basis of the first, etc. ‘What arouses the same sensations is the same’: but what is it that make sensations the same, ‘takes’ them as the same? – There could be no judgments at all if a kind of leveling had not first been carried out within the sensations: memory is only possible with a constant underscoring of what has been experienced, has become habit – – Before a judgment can be made, the process of assimilation must already have been completed: thus, here too there is an intellectual activity which does not enter consciousness, as in the case of pain caused by an injury. Probably, all organic functions have their correspondence in inner events, in assimilation, elimination, growth, etc. Essential to start from the body and use it as a guiding thread. It is the far richer phenomenon, and can be observed more distinctly. Belief in the body is better established than belief in the mind. ‘However strongly something is believed, that is not a criterion of truth.’ But what is truth? Perhaps a kind of belief which has become a condition of life? In that case, its strength would indeed be a criterion. E.g., regarding causality.
Notebook 40, August – September 1885, paragraph 15